142 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript
142 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Reproducer for opencode issue #26514:
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*
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* In Plan Mode (the `plan` agent), the main agent's edit/write tools are
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* blocked by the plan agent's permission ruleset (`edit: { "*": "deny" }`).
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* However, when the plan agent spawns a subagent via the `task` tool, the
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* subagent retains full file modification capabilities — a security bypass.
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*
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* This test replicates the permission ruleset that would govern a
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* `general` subagent when launched from a `plan` parent session, mirroring
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* the logic in `src/tool/task.ts` (filtered parent permissions ++ runtime
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* subagent agent permissions, evaluated as in `session/prompt.ts`).
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*
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* The expected (secure) behavior is that the subagent inherits the plan
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* mode read-only restriction and `edit`/`write` resolve to `deny`. On
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* origin/dev this assertion fails because the parent **agent** permissions
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* are not propagated to the subagent — only the parent **session**
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* permissions are passed through, and Plan Mode's restrictions live on the
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* agent, not the session.
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*/
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import { test, expect, afterEach } from "bun:test"
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import { Effect } from "effect"
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import { disposeAllInstances, provideInstance, tmpdir } from "../fixture/fixture"
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import { WithInstance } from "../../src/project/with-instance"
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import { Agent } from "../../src/agent/agent"
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import { deriveSubagentSessionPermission } from "../../src/agent/subagent-permissions"
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import { Permission } from "../../src/permission"
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afterEach(async () => {
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await disposeAllInstances()
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})
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function load<A>(dir: string, fn: (svc: Agent.Interface) => Effect.Effect<A>) {
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return Effect.runPromise(provideInstance(dir)(Agent.Service.use(fn)).pipe(Effect.provide(Agent.defaultLayer)))
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}
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// `deriveSubagentSessionPermission` is imported from production. The test
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// exercises the actual helper that task.ts uses to build the subagent's
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// session permission, so any regression in that helper trips this test.
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test("[#26514] subagent spawned from plan mode inherits read-only restriction (edit denied)", async () => {
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await using tmp = await tmpdir()
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await WithInstance.provide({
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directory: tmp.path,
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fn: async () => {
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const planAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("plan"))
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const generalAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("general"))
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
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expect(generalAgent).toBeDefined()
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// Sanity: the plan agent itself blocks edit. (Note: `write` and
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// `apply_patch` route through the `edit` permission at the runtime
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// tool layer — see Permission.disabled / EDIT_TOOLS.)
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", planAgent!.permission).action).toBe("deny")
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// Simulate the plan-mode parent session: in real flow the plan
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// session's `permission` field is empty (Plan Mode lives on the agent
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// ruleset, not the session). So we pass [] through as the parent
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// session permission, exactly like the actual code path.
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const parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: generalAgent!,
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})
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// Mirror the runtime evaluation in session/prompt.ts (~line 410, 639):
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// ruleset: Permission.merge(agent.permission, session.permission ?? [])
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const effective = Permission.merge(generalAgent!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/another/path/index.tsx", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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},
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})
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})
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test("[#26514] explore subagent launched from plan mode also stays read-only", async () => {
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// Sibling check: even though `explore` is intrinsically read-only, the
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// bug surface is the same. Including this case to document that the fix
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// should propagate the parent **agent** permissions, not just deny edit
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// when the subagent happens to already deny it.
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await using tmp = await tmpdir()
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await WithInstance.provide({
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directory: tmp.path,
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fn: async () => {
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const planAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("plan"))
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const explore = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("explore"))
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
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expect(explore).toBeDefined()
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const parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: explore!,
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})
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const effective = Permission.merge(explore!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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// Already deny — sanity check.
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/x.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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},
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})
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})
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test("[#26514] custom user subagent launched from plan mode bypasses Plan Mode read-only", async () => {
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// The most damaging case: a user-defined subagent with default
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// permissions (allow-by-default, like `general`). The subagent must NOT
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// be able to edit when the parent agent is `plan`.
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await using tmp = await tmpdir({
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config: {
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agent: {
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my_subagent: {
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description: "A user-defined subagent",
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mode: "subagent",
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},
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},
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},
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})
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await WithInstance.provide({
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directory: tmp.path,
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fn: async () => {
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const planAgent = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("plan"))
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const my = await load(tmp.path, (svc) => svc.get("my_subagent"))
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expect(planAgent).toBeDefined()
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expect(my).toBeDefined()
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const parentSessionPermission: Permission.Ruleset = []
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const subagentSessionPermission = deriveSubagentSessionPermission({
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parentSessionPermission,
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parentAgent: planAgent,
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subagent: my!,
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})
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const effective = Permission.merge(my!.permission, subagentSessionPermission)
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// BUG: on origin/dev edit resolves to "allow" because the plan
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// agent's `edit: deny *` rule never reaches the subagent.
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expect(Permission.evaluate("edit", "/some/file.ts", effective).action).toBe("deny")
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},
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})
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})
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